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Abstract Age gradient of the mechanism of stimulus-
response conXict cost was investigated in a population-
based representative sample of 291 individuals, covering
the age range from 6 to 89 years. Stimulus-response con-
Xict cost, indicated by the amount of additional processing
time required when there is a conXict between stimulus and
response options, follows a U-shaped function across the
lifespan. Lifespan age gradient of conXict cost parallels
closely those of processing Xuctuation and Xuid intelli-
gence. Individuals at both ends of the lifespan displayed a
greater amount of processing Xuctuation and at the same
time a larger amount of conXict cost and a lower level of
Xuid intelligence. After controlling for chronological age
and baseline processing speed, conXict cost continues to
correlate signiWcantly with Xuid intelligence in adulthood
and old age and with processing Xuctuation in old age. The
relation between processing Xuctuation and conXict cost in
old age lends further support for the neuromodulation of
neuronal noise theory of cognitive aging as well as for theo-
ries of dopaminergic modulation of conXict monitoring.
Introduction
Relative to research on working memory, attention, or inhi-
bition, a concerted eVort devoted toward understanding
“conXict monitoring” as a neurocognitive concept and phe-
nomenon in its own right is a recent endeavor that only
emerged in the past decade. Early behavioral Wndings from
the 1970s foreshadowed the notion that, the detection of
“conXict” in the processes of cognitive operations (e.g.,
such as error detection) plays an important role in informa-
tion processing (e.g., Higgins & Angel, 1970; Rabbitt,
1966). Contemporary cognitive monitoring research over
the past 10 years has established that monitoring mecha-
nisms—in terms of outcome, processing or response con-
Xict—are important adaptive signaling functions that could
serve the purpose of online dynamical reconWgurations of
the neurocognitive system in order for it to be suYciently
Xexible and goal-oriented (cf. Ridderinkhof & van den
Wildenberg, 2005).
Mechanisms subserving conXict monitoring operate in a
variety of related functions, such as outcome monitoring,
error detection, or conXict resolution. Emerging evidence
suggests that various regions of the prefrontal cortex (PFC)
as well as the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) are impli-
cated in processes of outcome monitoring, error processing,
reward-based learning, and conXict resolution (e.g., Cohen,
Aston-Jones, & Gilzenrat, 2004; Egner & Hirsh, 2005;
Ridderinkhof, Ullsperger, Crone, & Nieuwenhuis, 2004;
Ullsperger & von Cramon, 2004; Yeung, Botvinick, &
Cohen, 2004). According to some accounts, activities in
ACC send signals about detected conXicts (Botvinick &
Cohen, 2004) or error likelihoods (Brown & Braver, 2005)
to the PFC in order to generate stronger, compensatory PFC
representations to support or direct task-relevant process-
ing. In a related vein, PFC cognitive control mechanisms
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may bias processing to enhance target-relevant information,
thus resolving conXicts. For instance, activations in dorsal
lateral PFC have also been shown to display increased
functional connectivity to perceptual regions (e.g., fusiform
face area when face stimuli were used) under high conXict
conditions (Egner & Hirsh, 2005). Furthermore, empirical
evidence from animal models (e.g., Schultz, 2002) and
human studies (e.g., Berns, McClure, Pagnoni, Montague,
2001; Dolan et al., 1995; Schott et al., 2004; see also
Marschner et al., 2005) as well as various neurocomputa-
tional models (e.g., Frank, Seeberger, & O’Reilly, 2004;
Holroyd & Coles, 2002; Yeung et al., 2004) all point to the
involvements of frontal and midbrain dopaminergic systems
in modulating cognitive monitoring mechanisms (see also
Montague, Hyman, & Cohen, 2004, for review).
Whereas evidence of neural correlates of diVerent
aspects of conXict monitoring as well as theories of neuro-
modulation of conXict monitoring are gradually consolidat-
ing (e.g., Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001;
Brown & Braver, 2005; Holroyd & Coles, 2002; Yeung
et al.,  2004; see also Botvinick, Cohen, & Carter, 2004;
Montague et al., 2004, for reviews), research on the matura-
tion (e.g., Davies, Segalowitz, & Gavin, 2004; Ladouceur,
Dahl, & Carter, 2007; Rueda, Posner, Rothbart et al., 2004;
Santesso, Segalowitz, & Schmidt, 2006) and senescence
(Fernandez-Duque & Black, 2006; Mathewson, Dywan, &
Segalowitz, 2005) of conXict monitoring mechanisms has
only started. The commonly used conXict monitoring tasks
(e.g., the Stroop, Flanker, and Go/NoGo tasks) have been
applied to address questions of child cognitive development
or cognitive aging independently. Thus, so far a synopsis of
age-related diVerences in conXict monitoring and their neu-
ral correlates across the lifespan needs to pieced together
from diVerent sets of evidence that have been separately
collected at the two ends of the lifespan. Children’s perfor-
mance levels on the so-called “conXict tasks” (e.g., Xanker
and Go/NoGo tasks) are below the level of younger adults
(e.g., Davies et al., 2004; Rueda et al., 2004; Williams,
Ponesse, Schachar, Logan, & Tannock, 1999). Similarly,
older adults’ performances also compare unfavorably to
those of younger adults (e.g., Mathalon et al., 2003;
Mathewson et al., 2005; West, 2004; West & Moore,
2005). Initial evidence also suggests that children (Davies
et al., 2004) and older adults (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2002) are
less able in detecting errors than younger adults. However,
there is a lack of direct comparisons of children’s perfor-
mance with that of older adults. Hence, thus far, little is
known about the similarities and diVerences between the
maturation and senescence of conXict monitoring.
As for neural correlates of conXict monitoring, recent
Wndings from cognitive neuroscience of child development
(e.g., Sowell, Thompson, Holmes, Jernigan, & Toga, 2003)
and aging (e.g., Raz et al., 2005) reveal that PFC and ACC
mature late during child development and decline relatively
early during aging, relative to other brain areas, such as the
medial temporal structures. SpeciWcally, the maturational
gradients of PFC and ACC are very protracted, with contin-
uing development until late adolescence (Sowell et al.,
2003). At the neurofunctional level, the magnitude of
event-related potentials associated with incorrect responses
(i.e., error-related negativity) has been found to increase
from childhood to adulthood (Davies et al., 2004) and to
decrease during aging (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2002). At the
neurochemical level, age-related changes in dopaminergic
mechanisms during child development and aging that
underlie various aspects of cognitive processing are also
well established (for reviews, see Bäckman, Nyberg,
Lindenberger, Li, & Farde, 2006b; Diamond, 1996). At the
same time, a related but distinct line of research also
indicates that individual diVerences in within-person trial-
by-trial processing Xuctuations may be attributable to
development-, aging-, or pathology-related deWciencies in
dopaminergic modulations (e.g., see Castellanos &
Tannock, 2002; Diamond, Briand, Fossella, & Gehlbach,
2004; Li, Lindenberger, & Sikström, 2001; see MacDonald,
Nyberg, & Bäckman, 2006; Winterer & Weinberger, 2004,
for reviews). With respect to processing Xuctuations, chil-
dren and older adults tend to show higher levels of within-
person trial-by-trial RT variability (e.g., Li et al., 2004;
Williams, Hultsch, Strauss, Hunter, & Tannock, 2005).
Furthermore, older individuals who show greater short-
term trial-by-trial variability tend also to show greater
extent of longitudinal declines in tasks assessing executive
control (e.g., Lövdén, Li, Shing, & Lindenberger, 2007;
MacDonald, Hultsch, & Dixon, 2003) and less eYcient
functional brain activation in regions (e.g., inferior parietal
cortex) supporting episodic memory (MacDonald, Nyberg,
Sandblom, Fischer, & Bäckman, 2008).
Given that studies on the development and aging of con-
Xict monitoring mechanisms have thus far been conducted
separately, direct comparisons between the child develop-
mental and aging gradients are lacking. To bridge the gap,
we investigated lifespan development of conXict monitor-
ing in a sample that covered the age range from 6 to
89 years. SpeciWcally, we assessed conXict cost associated
with the incongruence between stimulus and response to
indicate individual diVerences in the eYcacy of conXict
monitoring mechanisms broadly deWned. Furthermore, in
order to understand the ontogenetic antecedents and conse-
quences of age-related diVerences in conXict monitoring, at
one level we examined the relations between the eYcacy of
conXicting monitoring and indicators of processing Xuctua-
tion, which could reXect the eYcacy of dopaminergic mod-
ulation; and at another level, we examined the relation
between conXict monitoring and Xuid intelligence, which is
supported by basic cognitive processes.Psychological Research (2009) 73:777–785 779
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Method
Study sample
The participants of this study were part of a population-
based representative sample of a large multi-session mul-
tivariate study on lifespan transformations in the functional
organizations of intellectual abilities and their underlying
basic cognitive and sensorimotor processes (the CoOP-
MIND Study, Drewing, Aschersleben, & Li, 2006; Hommel,
Li, & Li, 2004; Li et al., 2004; Waszak, Schneider, Li, &
Hommel, in press). The sample was stratiWed by age and
sex. After excluding participants who missed multiple test
sessions and/or health problems, the working sample
consists of 291 participants uniformly distributed across
31 age bins that covered the age range between 6 and
89 years. In light of diVerential rates of developmental
changes across the life span, 1-, 4-, and 3-year age bins
were used for age stratiWcation for ages 6–15, 16–59, and
60–89, respectively. To study lifespan diVerences in the
relations between stimulus-response conXict monitoring,
processing Xuctuation, and Xuid intelligence, the sample
was further divided into three continuous age groups that
cover (1) childhood to adolescence (6–17 years), (2)
adulthood (18–55 years), and (3) late adulthood and old
age (56–89 years).
Experimental task and procedure
The task we used to assess stimulus-response conXict cost
was a variant of the visual Xanker task (Eriksen & Eriksen,
1974). The task was controlled by a custom-made program
running on standard PCs connected to external response
keypads via serial cables. The stimuli consisted of one tar-
get circle in the center that was Xanked by four other circles
that were above, below, to the right, and to the left of the
target. The color of the center circle was either red or green,
each associated with a unique response key. The task of the
participants was to press the appropriate response key on
each trial depending on the color of the center circle. The
task included three conditions. Within each trial, after an
inter-trial interval of 1,200 ms a Wxation cross was pre-
sented in the center of the computer screen for 500 ms,
which was followed by a blank screen for 500 ms. The tar-
get stimulus (either a red or a green circle of about 70 mm
in diameter) was then presented on the screen. The target
circle was surrounded by four Xanker circles that were 1 cm
above, below, to the right, and to the left. In the compatible
condition, the color of oV-center circles (the Xankers) was
identical to the target circle. In the neutral condition, the
color of the Xankers was blue, which was neutral to either
of the two response keys. In the incompatible condition, the
color of the Xankers not only diVered from the color of the
center circle and was, at the same time, identical to the
color that required a competing response. Participants were
instructed to respond as fast as possible to the color of the
central target by pressing one of the two response keys. The
task was programmed such that no response could be made
either faster than 100 ms or longer than 2,500 ms after the
onset of the stimuli. If a correct response was made, a blank
screen followed for 1,200 ms until the next trial started
again. If an incorrect response was made, an error feedback
sign was given on the screen for 1,000 ms, and then the
blank screen followed for 1,200 ms until the next trial
started.
The experiment started with 18 practice trials (three
practice blocks of six trials that included randomized
presentations of two stimuli for each compatibility
conditions). After the experimenter made sure that the
participants understood all three task conditions, the experi-
mental session comprised seven blocks of 18 trials each,
resulting in a total of 126 trials. Within each block the
order of the three task conditions was randomized across
trials. Given that overall error rate in this task is usually
low even in young children (e.g., Rueda, Posner, &
Rothbart, 2005a) and in order to reduce age diVerences in
speed-accuracy tradeoV when comparing response conXict
score in terms of reaction time (RT) cost, the custom-made
program was designed to arrive at roughly equal error rates
across age groups, such that RT is the main performance
measure of this task. SpeciWcally, this was done by given
additional trials (up to a maximum of 18) of corresponding
trial type based on the number of incorrect response the
participant made. In our data, on average the numbers of
errors were minimum, even for the incongruent condition:
the error rate was 3.5% for children (6–11 years old), 2%
for teenagers (12–17 years old), 1.5% for younger adults
(18–35 years old), 1% for middle aged adults, and 1% for
older adults.
Measures of cognitive mechanics and processing 
Xuctuation
Other than assessing individual diVerences in conXict mon-
itoring, we also measured the so-called Xuid intelligence
(Gf), sometimes also known as cognitive mechanics, the
aspect of intelligence that is presumably more directly
related to information-processing and neurobiological
mechanisms. For this purpose, psychometric tests used in
the Berlin Aging Study (see Lindenberger & Baltes, 1997)
were adapted also for younger age groups across the life-
span (see Li et al., 2004). Data from tests reXecting basic
cognitive mechanics were of particular interest here, which
included three primary intellectual abilities: speed (mea-
sured by digit-letter substitution, digit-symbol substitution,
identical picture tests), memory (measured by activity,780 Psychological Research (2009) 73:777–785
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paired associate, and text recall tests), and reasoning (mea-
sured by tests of Wgural analogies, letter series, and practi-
cal problems).
Furthermore, we also measured within-person process-
ing Xuctuation, given emerging evidence as reviewed above
suggesting that it may reXect individual diVerences as well
as aging-related diVerences in dopaminergic modulation.
SpeciWcally, processing Xuctuation was assessed as a com-
posite measure that was based on trial-by-trial RT variabil-
ity in a range of elementary cognitive processing tasks,
including visual search, long-term and short-term memory
search, simple and choice reactions, in addition to the
Xanker task (see Li et al., 2004 for details about these
tasks).The spread of a RT distribution generally increases
linearly with the mean of the distribution (Wagenmakers &
Brown, 2007). However, an increasing body of evidence
reveals that measures of trial-to-trial RT variability are
indicative of individual diVerences in genotypes (see
Castellanos & Tannock, 2002; Winterer & Weinberger, 2004,
for reviews), in longitudinal declines of cognitive abilities
during aging (e.g., Lövdén et al., 2007) and in the func-
tional status of brain structure, neurotransmission, and neu-
ronal activities (see a MacDonald et al., 2006, for review).
Thus, current consensus is that measures of RT variability
in and of themselves are important variables to be exam-
ined, in addition to mean RTs. DiVerent approaches have
been proposed to adjust for individual diVerences in mean
RTs when analyzing processing Xuctuation. Here we took
the approach of regressing out trends of mean RTs across
trial and control for individual diVerences in baseline RTs
in relevant analyses. For each task, the measure of process-
ing Xuctuation was Wrst computed by linearly regressing
out trends across trials for each test conditions for each sub-
ject separately. Standard deviations of these residualized
RTs were then computed for each individual and each task
conditions to indicate the extent of Xuctuations in RTs (cf.
Williams et al. 2005). Given that the extent of Xuctuations
in residualized RTs may diVer between tasks, standardized
scores were used to compute a Wnal composite measure of
processing Xuctuation that was the unit-weighted average
of processing Xuctuations of the various elementary cogni-
tive tasks.
Results
U-shaped lifespan age gradient of conXict cost
To indicate age diVerences in the eYcacy of conXict moni-
toring, for each participant we computed a cost score by
subtracting median RT of the congruent trials from the
median RT of the incongruent trials. Median RT is less sen-
sitive to the skewness of the RT distribution than mean RT.
The longer it took the participant to react in the incongruent
trial given the conXict, the greater the conXict cost indicat-
ing less eYcacious conXict monitoring. The cross-sectional
age gradient of conXict monitoring across the life span is
shown in Fig. 1. The Wtted curve was based on the group
means of the 31 age bins and was derived from a combined
exponential decay and increase function of conXict cost (cf.
Cerella & Hale, 1994). The Wtted curve captured the U-
shaped lifespan developmental function and accounted for
71% (r = 0.84) of the variance in the data. ConXict cost
decreases steeply from early childhood to early adulthood,
remain stable in adulthood, and in early old age monitoring
cost starts to gradually increase again. ConXict costs of
individuals in the two youngest age bins (6–7 and 7–8 years
old) and the two oldest age bins (84–86 and 87–89 years
old) are, respectively, three and two times more than the
cost of individuals in the age range from 25 to 50 (Fig. 1).
Relations between age diVerences in conXict cost, 
processing Xuctuation, and Xuid intelligence
To examine and compare lifespan age gradients of con-
Xict cost, processing Xuctuation, and cognitive mechanics
(Gf), measures of these three variables were Wrst trans-
formed into the common T score metric. As shown in
Fig. 2, lifespan age gradients of conXict cost and process-
ing  Xuctuation parallel each other closely (Fig. 2, left
panel). ConXict cost and processing Xuctuation reduce
steadily from 6 to about 20 years of age, reach a minimum
Fig. 1 Lifespan age gradient of stimulus-response conXict. ConXict
monitoring score is computed as the cost of additional reaction time re-
quired for processing the Xanker task in the stimulus-response incon-
gruent condition in comparison to the time required for the congruent
conditionPsychological Research (2009) 73:777–785 781
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cost or Xuctuation level in early 20s, indicating that opti-
mal eYcacy in these two aspects of functioning is reached
by early adulthood. The age gradients remain stable from
early adulthood until about mid-50s; thereafter, conXict
cost and processing Xuctuation increase again. Similarly,
the age gradient of Xuid intelligence indicates that pri-
mary intellectual abilities in the domain of Xuid intelli-
gence (Gf) develop rapidly from 6 to about 20 years of
age, reaches maximum in early 20s and remains stable
until early 40s, and declines thereafter. The parallel age
gradients of conXict cost, processing Xuctuation, and Xuid
intelligence suggest that they may be related to each
other, either because they share some common underlying
mechanisms (e.g., maturation and senescence of neuro-
chemical and neurofunctional mechanisms) or because
elementary cognitive processes, such as conXict monitor-
ing and processing Xuctuation, contribute to the develop-
ment and aging of primary intellectual abilities.
To examine these relations, we separated the sample into
three continuous age groups covering childhood to adoles-
cence (6–17 years old), adulthood (18–55 years old), late
adulthood and old age (56–89 years old). Two separate sets
of hierarchical regression analyses were then conducted to
examine the relation between conXict monitoring and pro-
cessing  Xuctuation and between conXict monitoring and
Xuid intelligence.
With respect to Xuid intelligence, results in Table 1 and
Fig. 3 show that in terms of raw correlations, individual
diVerences in conXict cost and Xuid intelligence were sig-
niWcant in the child developmental and in the aging subs-
amples. It should be noted, however, raw correlations in
this case could be confounded with individual diVerences in
baseline RT as well as chronological age. Hierarchical
regressions were thus conducted to adjust for baseline RT
and age. The results show that the correlations between
conXict monitoring cost and Xuid intelligence are still
signiWcant and account for about 6 and 4% of individual
diVerences in adults and older adults (Table 1, Fig. 3).
With respect to processing Xuctuation, results in Table 1
and Fig. 4 show that in terms of raw correlations, the rela-
tions between conXict cost and processing Xuctuation were
signiWcant both in the child developmental and the aging
subsamples. Results from hierarchical regressions after
adjusting for baseline RT and age show that conXict cost
still correlated signiWcantly with processing Xuctuation (4%
of variance), but only in late adulthood and old age
(Table 1, Fig. 4).
Fig. 2 Parallel lifespan age gra-
dients of conXict cost, process-
ing Xuctuation (left panel), and 
Xuid intelligence (right panel). 
To plot the diVerent measures on 
the same scale, variables were 
transformed into the T-score 
metric
Table 1 Hierarchical regressions of conXict cost, baseline reaction
time, and age on cognitive mechanics and processing Xuctuation
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Age group Cognitive 
mechanics (Gf)
Processing 
Xuctuation
6–17 years
Raw R2 0.073** 0.071**
Hierarchical regression
Predictor Incremental R2
Baseline RT 0.44*** 0.43***
Age 0.30*** 0.071**
ConXict cost 0.003 0.009
18–55 years
Raw R2 0.03 0.006
Hierarchical regression
Predictor Incremental R2
Baseline RT 0.071* 0.30***
Age 0.20*** 0.02
ConXict cost 0.057** 0.004
56–89 years
Raw R2 0.093** 0.071**
Hierarchical regression
Predictor Incremental R2
Baseline RT 0.12*** 0.30***
Age 0.25*** 0.14***
ConXict cost 0.04* 0.04*782 Psychological Research (2009) 73:777–785
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Discussion
Findings from this study reveal that, similar to other basic
cognitive processes and intellectual abilities, the age gradi-
ent of conXict monitoring follows a U-function across the
lifespan: with a slightly steeper growth gradient during
childhood and adolescence and a more gradual declining
gradient during late adulthood and old age. Furthermore,
lifespan age gradient of conXict monitoring parallels very
closely to the gradient of processing Xuctuation at one level
and the gradient of Xuid intelligence at another level. Indi-
viduals at both ends of the lifespan yielded larger conXict
cost and at the same time displayed a greater extent of pro-
cessing Xuctuations in elementary cognitive processes and
a lower level of performance in tasks assessing Xuid intelli-
gence. Individuals in adulthood showed least conXict cost,
least processing Xuctuation, and best performance in mea-
sures of Xuid intelligence.
The details of how these three aspects of functions
related to each other, however, diVered across the lifespan.
During childhood and adolescence, the associations
between conXict monitoring and process Xuctuation and
between conXict monitoring and Xuid intelligence are pri-
marily shared with individual diVerences in baseline pro-
cessing speed and chronological age. After controlling for
individual diVerences in processing speed and age, conXict
monitoring no longer correlates with either processing Xuc-
tuation or cognitive mechanics. In adulthood, after control-
ling for individual diVerences in processing speed and age,
conXict monitoring still accounts for a small but reliable
amount of variance in Xuid intelligence. In late adulthood
and old age, conXict monitoring remained to be signiWcantly
Fig. 3 Relations between con-
Xict cost and Xuid intelligence 
before (left) and after (right) 
controlling for baseline RT 
and age
Fig. 4 Relations between con-
Xict cost and processing Xuctua-
tion before (left) and after (right) 
controlling for baseline RT 
and agePsychological Research (2009) 73:777–785 783
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correlated with Xuid intelligence and, importantly, with
processing Xuctuation, even after controlling for baseline
processing speed and age. The fact that, during childhood
and adolescence, the contribution of conXict cost to Xuid
intelligence is not independent of individual diVerences in
baseline processing speed and in other factors correlated
with chronological age indicates less diVerentiated pro-
cesses in premature cognitive systems. Thus, measures of
conXict monitoring mechanisms in children may be less
task speciWc, and reXect additional processes that aVecting
processing speed and other factors. More generally speak-
ing, this Wnding of lifespan diVerences in the correlations
between conXict cost and other aspects of cognition high-
lights the developmental dynamics in conXict monitoring
mechanisms. As brain and behavioral processes undergo
functional reorganizations throughout development across
the lifespan (Johnson, 2001; Li et al., 2004; Lindenberger,
Li, & Bäckman, 2006; Park et al., 2004), conXict monitor-
ing mechanisms may involve diVerent brain functional
circuitries and may aVect diVerent constellations of high-
level cognitive abilities.
The signiWcant relation between conXict cost and Xuid
intelligence in adulthood and old age suggests that conXict
monitoring is a putative basic cognitive mechanism that
subserves intellectual abilities. In childhood, conXict moni-
toring also contributes to the functioning of primary intel-
lectual abilities; however, processing speed and other
factors covariate with age play more important roles. The
unique association between conXict cost and processing
Xuctuation in late adulthood and old age lends further sup-
port to the neuromodulation of neuronal noise theory of
cognitive aging (e.g., Li et al., 2001; Li, von Oertzen, &
Lindenberger, 2006) and theories on dopamine’s involve-
ment in conXict monitoring (e.g., Frank et al., 2004; Holroyd
& Coles, 2002; Yeung et al., 2004). On the one hand,
empirical data and simulation results suggest that aging-
related deWcit in dopaminergic modulation contributes to
greater processing Xuctuation, and on the other hand, dopa-
mine is postulated to be involved in diVerent aspects of
conXict monitoring, including the more basic process,
response conXict monitoring as examined here (Frank et al.,
2004; see Montague et al., 2004, for review). SpeciWcally,
dopamine D1 receptor has been found to implicate the
binding of perception with action (Colzato & Hommel,
2008, in press), which could be directly relevant to individ-
ual diVerences in conXict cost that arises from the incongru-
ence between the stimulus feature and response action as
examined here. EVects of dopaminergic modulation on cog-
nitive processes have also been investigated with respect to
child development (e.g., Castellanos & Tannock, 2002;
Diamond, 1996; Rueda, Rothbart, McCandliss, Saccomanno,
& Posner, 2005b). We found a relation between processing
Xuctuation and conXict cost in children and adolescence as
well. However, this eVect is mostly shared with processing
speed and age, indicating that mechanisms in addition to
neuromodulation of processing noise may add further inXu-
ences here.
Furthermore, there is also evidence showing that individ-
ual diVerences in brain activity related to conXict processing
are genetically predisposed (Anokhin, Heath, & Mayers,
2004). Currently there are rapid developments in combining
genomic approaches with functional brain imaging and cog-
nitive experiments in understanding the relations between
neuromodulation of functional brain processes and cogni-
tion in children and adolescence (e.g., Cornish and Hollis
2002; Rueda et al., 2005a; Wahlstrom et al., 2007), in adults
(e.g., Frank, Moustafa, Haughey, Curran, & Hutchison,
2007), during aging (e.g., Bäckman, Nyberg, & Farde,
2006a; Nagel et al., 2008) or in the case of pathology (e.g.,
Frank et al., 2002; Winterer & Weinberger, 2004). Future
research on lifespan development of conXict monitoring
could beneWt from taking a combined genomic neurocogni-
tive research to disentangle individual and developmental
diVerences in gene–brain–behavior relations.
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